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Abstract-In this paper,.we introduce and study a new class of constrained multiobjective games 
in H-spaces without linear structure. An existence theorem of solutions for quasi-equilibrium prob- 
lems is first proved in noncompact H-spaces. Then, as applications of the quasi-equilibrium ex- 
istence theorem, several existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for 
the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact H-spaces. These theorems im- 
prove, unify, and generalize the corresponding results of the multiobjective games in recent literature. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of an equilibrium point for an n-person game was first introduced by Nash [1,2], 
who established the exktence of the equilibrium point under certain assumptions. Since then, 
the Nash equilibrium problem for n-person games has been intensively studied and extended by 
a number of authors under various assumptions and different directions. The constrained games 
with finite or infinite players is an important generalization of n-person games which have been 
widely studied by many authors. 
Recently, much attention has been focused on the game problems with vector payoffs in game 
theory, for example, see [3-131 and the references therein. One of the reasons is that multicriteria 
models can be better alpplied to real-world situations. The motivation for the study of multi- 
criteria models can be found in [3-51. The existence of Pareto equilibria is one of fundamental 
problems. In order to guarantee the existence of Pareto equilibria of the multiobjective games 
without constraints, some sufficient conditions have been given by several authors, for example, 
see [9-131. 
In this paper, we introduce a new class of multiobjective games with constrained correspon- 
dences. An existence theorem of solutions for quasi-equilibrium problems is first proved in non- 
compact H-space without linear structure. Then, by employing the existence result, several 
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existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multi- 
objective games are established in noncompact H-spaces without linear structure. The theorems 
improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding existence results of Pareto equilibria for the 
multiobjective games in recent literature. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
For a set X, we shall denote by 2x and F(X) the family of all subsets of X and the family 
of all nonempty finite subset of X, respectively. A subset B of a topological space X is said to 
be compactly open (respectively, compactly closed) in X if for any nonempty compact subset K 
of X, B f’ K is open (respectively, closed) in K. 
The following notions, which were introduced by Bardaro and Ceppitelli [14,15], were motivated 
by the earlier works of Horvath [16,17]. 
A pair (X,{rA)) is said to be an H-space if X is a topological space and {PA} is a family of 
contractible subsets of X indexed by A E F(X) such that PA C IA’ whenever A C A’. Clearly, 
each topological vector space and its convex subsets are all H-space with IA = co(A) for each 
A E 3(X) where co(A) is the convex hull of A. A subset B of an H-space (X, {PA}) is said to 
be 
(i) H-convex if PA C B for each A E F(B), 
(ii) weakly H-convex if PA n B is contractible for each A E F(B). 
Following [18], for a nonempty subset B of an H-space (X, {PA}), we define the H-convex hull 
of B, denoted by H-co(B), as 
H-co(B) = n{E c X : B c E, E is H-convex}. 
By Lemma 1 of [18], we have 
H-co(B) = U{H-co(A) : A E F(B)}. 
Let Y be a nonempty set, (X, {PA}) be an H-space, and P : Y --+ 2x be a set-valued mapping. 
The mapping H-co(P) : Y + 2 x is defined by (H-cop)(y) = H-co(P(y)) for each y E Y. 
Let (X,{rA)) b e an H-space and 4 : X x X --) R U {*co} be a function. For each given 
5 E X, 4(z, y) is said to be H-quasi-convex (respectively, H-quasi-concave) in y if for any X E R, 
the set {y E X : 4(x, y) < X} (respectively, {y E X : 4(x, y) > X}) is H-convex. 4(z, y) is said 
to be X-H-diagonally quasi-convex (respectively, X-H-diagonally quasi-concave) in y if for any 
A E F(X) and for any ICO E H-co(A), maxyeA $(~a, y) 2 x (respectively, min,eA ~(zo, y) 5 X). 
These notions extend the corresponding notions of Zhou and Chen [19] in topological vector 
spaces. 
Let N = { 1,2,. . . , n} and Xi be a topological space for each i E N. We shall use the following 
notations: 
x=lix” and xz = n xj. 
iEN HEN, j#i 
For each z E X, zi denotes its ith coordinate and 2” the projection of x on X”. Write x = (xi, x;). 
In this paper, we shall consider a constrained game with finite players and multicriteria in its 
strategic form r = (Xi, Ai, Fi)iGN. For each player i E N, Xi is its strategy set; Ai : X; -+ 2xi 
is its constrained correspondence which restricts the strategies of the ith player to the subset 
Ai C Xi when all the other players have chosen their strategies xj E Xj, j # i, and 
Fi = (ff,f;,...,f;J : X 4 R”” is its payoff function (or say, loss function or multicriteria), 
where ki is a positive integer. In such a constrained multiobjective game, the other players 
influence player j E N 
(a) indirectly, by restricting js feasible strategies to Aj(xj), 
(b) directly, by affecting js payoff function Fj. 
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Ifastrategyz=(s1,z2,... , zn) E X is played, each player i is trying to minimize her/his payoff 
function Fi(z) = (ff(~), f;(z), . . . , f&(z)), w ic consists of noncommensurable outcomes. Each h h 
player i has a preference t-i over the outcome space R Ici . For each player i E N, its preference ~-i 
is given as 
2 yi 22, if and only if .~j’ > .~j”, vj = 1,2,. . . , ki, 
where Z’ = (z:, ~21,. . . , $) and z2 = (z;, z$, . . . , z$) are any elements in Rki. The play- 
ers’ preference relations induce the preference on X, defined for each player i, and choose 
x = (x1,x2 ,. . . ,xn) and y = (y1,y2,. . . ,y/“) by 
X k-i Y7 whenever Fi(x) &t Fi(y). 
In the constrained multiobjective game, each player i E N is trying to minimize her/his own 
payoff according to her/‘his preferences. 
If A(x’) = Xi for each i E N and for all x’ E X’, then the model of constrained multiobjective 
games reduces to the model of multicriteria games G = (Xi, Fi)ieN studied by Wang [9,10], 
Ding [ll], Yuan and Tarafdar [12], and Yu and Yuan [13]. If for each player i E N, Fi(x) = fi(x), 
i.e., ki = 1, which consists of commensurable outcomes, then the model of the constrained 
multiobjective games reduces to the model of the constrained games (or say, metagames) studied 
by Aubin [20, pp. 282-2831, Aubin and Ekeland [21, pp. 350-3511, Ding [22,23], Tian [24], and 
Yuan, Isac, Tan and Yu [25]. 
For the games with vector payoff functions (or say, multicriteria), as it is well known, in general, 
there does not exist a strategy 2 E X to minimize (or equivalently to say, maximize) all f$ for 
each player i E N, for example, see reference [7]. Hence, we need to give some concepts of 
solutions of the constrained multiobjective games. Throughout this paper, for each given m E N, 
we shall denote by RI;_” the nonnegative orthant of R”, i.e., 
R~={u=(u1,u2 ,..., um)~Rm:uj>0,Vj=1,2 ,... m}, 
so that the nonnegative orthant RT of R” has a nonempty interior with the topology induced 
in terms of convergence of vectors with respect to the Euclidean metric. That is, 
intRT=={zL=(u1,zL2 ,..., um)ERm:‘1Lj>0,Vj=1,2 ,..., m}. 
We denote by T+” and int T+” the simplex of RI; and its relative interior, respectively, i.e., 
Now we have the foll.owing definitions. 
DEFINITION 2.1. A strategy fi E Xi of player i is said to be a Pareto eficient strategy (re- 
spectively, a weak Pareto eficient strategy) with respect to P E X if fi E A(?;) and there is no 
strategy x” E A(3i‘;) such that 
Pi(?) - Fi (xi,i”) E Rk; \ (0) (respectively, Fi(P) - Fi (xi,?‘) E int R$) . 
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DEFINITION 2.2. A strategy 2 E X is said to be a Pareto equilibrium (respectively, a weak Pareto 
equilibrium) of the constrained multiobjective game I? = (Xi, Ai, Fi)ieN if, for each player i E N, 
2; E A”(f;) is a Pareto efficient strategy (respectively, a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with 
respect to f. 
From the above definitions, it is clear that each Pareto equilibrium is a weak Pareto equilibrium, 
but the converse is not always true. We also need the following definition. The idea is from that 
of Wang [9,10]. 
DEFINITION 2.3. A strategy f E X is said to be a weighted Nash-equilibrium with respect 
to the weighted vector W = (W’, W2, . . . , Wn) of a constrained multiobjective game l? = 
(Xi, Ai, Fi)ie~ if for each player i E N, we have 
(1) $ E Ai( 
(2) Wi E R$ \ (0); 
(3) Wi . Fi(3) i: Wi 1 Fi( xi, $), Vlzi E Ai where . denotes the inner product in Rki. 
REMARK 2.1. In particular, if Wi E Tf for each i E N, then the strategy 5 E X is said to 
be a normalized weighted Nash-equilibrium with respect to W. Prom the definitions above, it is 
not difficult to verify that a strategy 5 E X is a weighted Nash-equilibrium with respect to the 
weighted vector W = (W’, W2,. . . , W”) of the game l? = (Xz,Ai, Fi)ie~ if and only if 2 E X 
is an optimal solution of the constrained optimization problem: find 5 E X such that for each 
i E N, 
pi E Ai 2; ) 
( > 
Wi . Fi(?) = min 
z”EA’@) 
3. QUASI-EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS 
In order to prove the existence of solutions of the quasi-equilibrium problems, we need the 
following result which is Corollary 3.2 of [26]. 
LEMMA 3.1. Let (X,{I’A}) b e an H-space, K be a nonempty compact subset of X, and G : 
X --+ 2x be such that 
(i) for each y E X, G-l(y) is compactly open in X, 
(ii) for each N E 3(X), there exists a nonempty compact weakly H-convex subset LN of X 
containing N such that for each x E LN \ K, H-co(G(z)) n LN # 0, 
(iii) for each 2 E K, G(s) # 0. 
Then there exists a point S? E K such that i E G(P). 
LEMMA 3.2. Let X, Y be topological spaces, a’, q : X -+ 2y be two set-valued mappings, and 
D be a compactly closed subset of X. Assume @(xc) c 9(z) for each x E X and for each y E Y, 
@-l(y) and V1( y are both compactly open in X. Then the mapping G : X 4 2y defined by ) 
G(x) = 
@(XL if ED, 
q(x), ifxEX\D 
is such that for each y E Y, G-l(y) is compactly open in X. 
PROOF. For any given y E Y, we have Q-l(y) c Q-l(y) since (a(x) c Q(x), Vx E X, and 
G-‘(y) = {x E X : y E G(x)} 
= {x E D : y E G(x)} u {x E X \ D : y E Q(x)} 
= (D n a-l(~)) u [(x \ D) n WY)] 
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= [(D”mY)) U(X\D)] ” [(D”WY)) UQk-‘(Y)] 
= [x I- (WY) u tx \ D,>] " [(D u WY)) " p+(Y) u WY))] 
= [Q-l(y) u w \ q "WY> 
= W(y) u [(X \ D) n x&-l(y)] . 
Since both Q-l(y) and Q-l(y) are compactly open and X \ D is compactly open in X, it follows 
that G-l(y) is also compactly open in X. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let (X, (I’,J}) b e an H-space, K be a nonempty compact subset of X, and F be 
a nonempty set. Let T : .X + F, A : X -+ 2x, andf:XxF-+RU{fm} besuchthat 
(i) A has nonempty .H-convex values such that for each y E X, A-l(y) is compactly open 
in X &d the set .D = {x E X : x E A(z)} is compactly closed in X, 
(ii) for each y E X, the set {x E X : f(x, Tx) - f(y, Tz) 5 0) is compactly closed in X, 
(iii) the function 4(x, y) = f(z, Tz) - f(y, TX) is O-H-diagonally quasi-concave in y, 
(iv) for each N E 3(X), there exists a nonempty compact weakly H-convex subset LN of X 
containing N such that for each x E LN \ K, if x $ D, then A(x) n LN # 0; if x E D, 
then A(X) n H-co~(P(x)) ” LN # 8 w h ere P(x) = {y E X : f(x,Tx) - f(y,Tx) > 0). 
Then there exists 2 E X such that 
f E A(P), 
f(% =I I f(y, TP), Vy E A(?). 
PROOF. Define set-valued mappings P : X + 2x by 
P(x) = {Y E X : ftx,Tx) - fty,Tx) > 01, VXEX. 
By Assumptions (ii), for each y E X, P-‘(y) = {x E X : f(x,Tx) - f(y,Tx) > 0) is compactly 
open in X. By Lemma 3..1 of [26], we have that for each y E X, (H-COP)-‘(~) is also compactly 
open in X. Now assume that for each x E D, A(z) n P(x) # 8. Define a mapping G : X -+ 2x 
by 
G(x) = 
{ 
A(x) n H-co(P(x)), if x E D, 
A(x), ifxEX\D. 
Then, by Condition (i), G: has nonempty H-convex values and by Lemma 2.2, G-l(y) is compactly 
open in X for each y E X. It is easy to see that Condition (iv) implies that Condition (ii) of 
Lemma 2.1 holds. By Lemma 2.1, there exists a li E X such that f E G(Z). If f E D, then 
f E G(h) = A(?)RH-co(P@)) c H-co(P(?)). By L emma 1 of 1181, there exists an A1 E 3(P(O)) 
such that % E H-co(A~), and hence, 
cW, Y) = f(*, TP) - f(y, T2) > 0, VY E AI, 
which contradicts Condition (iii). If f $ D, then f E G(g) = A(i) which is impossible by the 
definition of D. Therefore, there exists a ? E D such that A(P) n P(k) = 8, i.e., there exists 
f E X such that 
f E A(?), 
ft&Tg) I fty, TP), Vy E A(?). 
REMARK 3.1. It is easy to see that if for each x E X, the function y H f(y, TX) is H-quasi- 
convex, then Condition (iii) of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied. Hence, Theorem 3.1 improves Theo- 
rem 2.1 of [27] and Theorem 4.2 of [28] in several aspects. 
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COROLLARY 3.1. Let (X,{rA}) b e an H-space, K be a nonempty compact subset of X, A : 
X -+ 2x be a set-valued mapping, and f : X x X ---f R U {&co} be a function such that 
(i) Condition (i) of Theorem 3.1 holds, 
(ii) for each y E X, the set {x E X : f(z, x) - f(y, x) 5 0} is compactly closed in X, 
(iii) the function 4(x, y) = f(z, x) - f(y, x) is O-H-diagonally quasi-concave in y, 
(iv) for each N E 3(X), there exists a nonempty compact weakly H-convex subset LN of X 
containing N such that for each x E LN \ K, if x $ D, then A(x) n LN # 0; if x E D, 
then A(z) n H-co(P(x)) n LN # 0 w h ere P(x) = {y E X : f(z,x) - S(g,x) > O}. 
Then there exists a f E X such that 
If we further assume f (x, x) 2 0 for all x E X, then we have 
i E A(Z), 
f(Y7i) 2 0, Vy E A(i). 
PROOF. Putting F = X and T being the identity mapping in Theorem 3.1, the first conclusion 
follows from Theorem 3.1. The second conclusion obviously holds. 
REMARK 3.2. If IC H f (x,x) is lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and y H 
f (5,~) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X, then Condition (ii) is satisfied 
automatically. If for each x E X, y ++ f(y,x) is H-quasi-convex, then Condition (iii) is satisfied 
automatically. 
4. EXISTENCE OF WEIGHTED NASH-EQUILIBRIUM 
As an application of Corollary 3.1, we have the following existence theorems of the weighted 
Nash-equilibrium for the constrained multiobjective game. 
THEOREM 4.1. Letr = (Xi,Ai,Fi)iE~ be a constrained multiobjective game where (Xi, {I’>,}) 
is an H-space, Ai : X” --+ 2xi is the constrained correspondence, and Fi = (f;, fi, . . . , fl, ) : 
X -+ Rki is the payoff function for each player i E N. For each i E N, let Ki be a nonempty 
compact (not necessarily H-convex) subset of Xi and K = niE,, Ki. Suppose that there exists a 
weighted vector W = (W’, W2,. . . , Wn) with Wi E R”l \ (0) such that the following conditions 
axe satisfied. 
(i) For each i E N, Ai has nonempty H-convex values such that for each y/i E Xi, (Ai)-l(yyi) 
is compactly open in X’ and the set D = {x E X : x E A(x)} is compactly closed in X 
where A(x) = niEN Ai(xc;) for each x E X. 
(ii) The function f : X x X + R defined by f (y,x) = CIEN Wi Fi(yi, z”) satisfies that 
x H f(x, x) is lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for each fixed 
x E x, Y I-+ f(GY) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X. 
(iii) The function 4(x, y) = f (x, x) - f (y, x) is O-H-diagonally quasi-concave in y. 
(iv) For each N E 3(X), there exists a nonempty compact weakly H-convex subset LN of X 
containing N such that for each x E LN \ K, if x $ D, then A(z) n LN # 0; if x E D, 
then A(x) n H-co(P(x)) n LN # 0 w ereP(x)={yEX:f(x,x)-f(y,x)>O}. h 
Then r has at least one weighted Nash-equilibrium point 2 E X with respect to the weighted 
vector W. 
PROOF. LetX = niEN Xi with the product topology and for each i E N, let Pi : X ---f Xi be 
the projection of X onto Xi. For any A E 3(X), let rA = fliEN l?i, where Ai = P,(A), then 
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by [lg, P. 1341, (X, {r~)) is an H-space. Clearly, K is a nonempty compact subset of X. By 
Condition (i), we have that for each z E X, A(z) = niE,, Ai is nonempty H-convex and for 
eachyEX, 
A-‘(y) = {x E X : y E A(s)} 
= 
t 
xeX:y%Ai x’ ,‘v’i~N 
( > > 
= n (Xi x {x” E X’ : x’ E (Ai)-l (y”)}) 
iEN 
= (-) (Xi x (Ai)-’ (y”)) 
iEN 
is compactly open in X. Hence, Condition (i) of Corollary 3.1 is satisfied. By Conditions (ii)-( 
it is easy to see that A and f satisfy all conditions of Corollary 3.1. Hence, there exists a 2 E X 
such that f E A(g) and 
f(%i) I f(Y, 2), VY E A(f), 
that is, 
c Wi. Fi @g’) 5 c Wi . Fi (~$2;) , Vy E A(?). 
iEN iEN 
(4.1) 
For each i E N and for any given yi E Ai( let y = (yi,$;), then we have that y E A(f) and it 
follows from (4.1) that Wi . Fi(?) 5 Wi . Fi(yi,fi) for all yvi E Ai( This proves that for each 
i E N, 
fi E /ii ,jj; 
( > 
and Wi . Fi(Z) = min Wi . ji’i yi, 2’ , 
&zAi(.$) ( 1 
i.e., 2 E X is a weighted Nash-equilibrium point of r with respect to the weighted vector W. 
REMARK 4.1. If (Xi,{l?~i}) is a compact H-space for each i E N, then, letting Ki = Xi for 
each i E N and LN = X = niEN Xi for each N E 3(X), Condition (iv) of Theorem 4.1 is 
satisfied trivially. 
COROLLARY 4.1. Let I’ = (Xi,Ai, Fi)ic~ be a constrained multiobjective game where Xi is 
a nonempty convex sul5set of a topological vector space, Ai : X’ + 2x’ is the constrained 
correspondence, and Fi = (f,i, f$, . . . , fi; ) : X -+ R’” is the payoff function for each i E N. For 
each i E N, let Ki be a nonempty compact subset of Xi and K = niEN Ki. Suppose that there 
exists a weighted vector W = (W’, W2,. . . , Wn) with Wi E Rki \ (0) for each i E N such that 
the following conditions are satisfied. 
(i) For each i E N, Ai has nonempty convex values and for each y” E Xi, (Ai)-l(yi) is 
compactly open in Xi, and the set D = {x E X : z E A(x)} is compactly closed in X 
where A(x) = niEN Ai for each x E X. 
(ii) Condition (ii) of Theorem 4.1 holds. 
(iii) The function 4(x, y) = f(x, x) - f(y, x) is O-d ia g onally quasi-concave in y (see i-291). 
(iv) For each N E 3’(X), there exists a compact convex subset LN of X containing N such 
thatforeachx E LN\K, ifx $! D, thenA(z)nL~ # 0;ifx E D, thenA(z)nLNnco({y E 
x : f(x, x> - f(%l, x> > 01) # 0. 
Then l? has at least a weighted Nash-equilibrium point with respect to the weighted vector W. 
PROOF. For each i E N and for each Ai E F(Xi), let I’>; = CoAi, then each (Xi, {I’;,}) is an 
H-space. The conclusion of Corollary 4.1 follows from Theorem 4.1. 
COROLLARY 4.2. Let I’ = (Xi, Fi)icN be a multiobjective game, where Xi is a nonempty con- 
vex subset of a topological vector space and Fi = (fi, fi,. . . , fii) : X + Rk” is the payoff 
function of the ith player for each i E N. For each i E N, let Ki be a nonempty compact 
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(not necessarily convex) subset and K = fliEN K,. Suppose that there exists a weighted vector 
W=(W1,W2,...,W”) withWiERki\{O}f or each i E N such that the following conditions 
are satisfied. 
(i) The function f : X x X -+ R defined by f(y,z) = ziEN Wi . Fi(y”,z’) satisfies that 
x H f (x,x) is lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for each fixed 
x E x, Y I-+ f(X>Y) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X. 
(ii) The function 4(x, y) = f(x, x) - f(y, x) is O-diagonally quasi-concave in y. 
(iii) For each N E F(X), there exists a compact convex subset LN of X containing N such 
that for each x E LN \ K, 
LN n CO({Y E x : f(X, X) - f(Y, X) > 0)) # 0. 
Then l? has at least a weighted Nash-equilibrium point with respect to the weighted vector W. 
PROOF. For each i E N and for all xi E X”, let Ai = Xi, then the conclusion of Corollary 4.2 
holds from Corollary 4.1. 
REMARK 4.2. If Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Corollary 4.2 are replaced by the following conditions, 
respectively: 
(ii)’ for each fixed x E X, the function y +-+ CiEN Wi . Fi(yi,x’) is quasi-convex, 
(iii)’ there exists a nonempty compact convex subset X0 of X such that for each x E X \ K, 
there exists y E co(Xo U {x}) such that 
c Wi . Fi (xi,x”) > c wi. Fi (yi,x”) 
iEN iEN 
Then the conclusion of Corollary 4.2 still holds. In fact, it is clear that Condition (ii)’ implies 
Condition (ii) of Corollary 4.2. Now we show that Condition (iii)’ implies Condition (iii). For 
each N E F(X), let LN = co(Xo U N), then LN is a compact convex subset of X containing N. 
For each x E LN \ K, we have co(Xo u {x}) c LN and there exists y E co(Xo U {x}) c LN 
such that f(x,x) > f(y,x) by Condition (iii)‘, where f(y,x) = CiEN Wi . Fi(yi,x’). Hence, 
we obtain y E LN n (9 E X : f(x,x) - f(y,x) > 0). Clearly, LN n co({y E X : f(x, x) - 
f(Y,X> > 01) # 0, i.e., (iii)’ + (iii). Therefore, Corollary 4.2 improves and generalizes Theorem 1 
of [12], Theorem 2 of [13], Theorem 3.1 of [lo], Theorem 1.11 of [3], and Theorem 1 of [6] in 
several aspects. Theorem 4.1 further unifies and generalizes the above results to the constrained 
multiobjective game and H-spaces without linear structure. 
5. EXISTENCE OF PARETO EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, we shall employ the existence result of the weighted Nash-equilibrium in the 
above section to deduce some existence results of Pareto equilibrium for constrained multiob- 
jective games. In order to do so, we first need the following lemma which tells us that the 
existence problems of Pareto equilibrium for constrained multiobjective games can be reduced to 
the existence of the weighted Nash-equilibrium under certain circumstances. 
LEMMA 5.1. Each normalized weighted Nash-equilibrium 2 E X with respect to a weight W = 
(Wl, W2,. . . , Wn) E nieN T$ (respectively, W E fliCN int T?) for a constrained multiobjective 
game r = (Xi, Ai, Fi). &N is a weak Pareto equilibrium (respectively, a Pareto equilibrium) of 
the game l?. 
PROOF. Noting the definitions of weighted Nash-equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium for the 
constrained multiobjective games, by using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.1 of 
[lo, pp. 376-3771, it is easy to show that the conclusion of Lemma 5.1 holds, and hence, we omit 
it. 
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REMARK 5.1. We should note that the conclusion of Lemma 5.1 still holds if P E X is a weighted 
Nash-equilibrium with a weight W E nicN R? \ (0) (respectively, W E niE,,, int R$) of the 
game I’. It should be al.so pointed out that a Pareto equilibrium of l? is not necessarily a weighted 
Nash-equilibrium of thse game r. 
THEOREM 5.1. Let r = (Xi,Ai,Fi)iEN be a constrained multiobjective game where each 
(Xi,{I’\,}) is an H-SjDaCe and Ai : X” + 2xi is the constrained correspondence and Fi = 
(f;,f;,...,f;J :X + RICi is the loss function for each player i E N. For each i E N, let Ki be 
a nonempty compact subset of Xi and let K = ni,, Ki. Suppose that there exists a weighted 
vector W = (W’, W2,. . . , W”) with Wi E Rki \ (0) f or each i E N such that Conditions (i)-(iv) 
of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied. Then r has at least a weak Pareto equilibrium point in X. In 
addition, if W = ( W1, W2,. . . , Wn) E niGN int Tf’ , then r has at least a Pareto equilibrium 
point in X. 
PROOF. By Theorem 4.1, I’ has at least a weighted Nash-equilibrium point i E X with respect 
to the weighted vector W. Lemma 5.1 shows that P is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point of l?, 
and a Pareto equilibrium point of F if W E int T? . 
As immediate consequences of Theorem 5.1, we can easily obtain the following results. 
COROLLARY 5.1. Let I? = (Xi,Ai,Fi)iE~ be a constrained multiobjective game. For each player 
i E N, its strategy set Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space, Ai : X’ -+ 2xi 
is its constrained correspondence, and Fi = (fi, fi, . . . , fii) : X -+ R”+ is its payoff function. 
Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W = (W’, W2,. . . , Wn) E niEN R”’ \ (0) such that 
Conditions (i)-(iv) of lcorollaxy 4.1 hold. Then r has at least a weak Pareto equilibrium point 
2 E X. Furthermore, if W E niEN int T:, then I’ has at least a Pareto equilibrium point. 
PROOF. By Corollary 4.1, l? has at least a weighted Nash-equilibrium point 2 E X with respect 
to the weighted vector W. Now Lemma 5.1 implies that 2 is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point 
of I?, and a Pareto equilibrium point of r if W E niEN int T$. 
REMARK 5.2. Corollary’5.1 generalizes Theorem 2 of [12], Theorem 4 of [13], and Theorem 3.2 
of [lo] to constrained rnultiobjective games under much weaker assumptions. 
COROLLARY 5.2. Let r = (Xi,Ai,Fi)iE~ be a constrained multiobjective game. For each 
player i E N, its strategy set Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space, 
Ai : Xi -+ 2xi is its (constrained correspondence, and Fi = (f:, fi, . . . , fii) : X + Rki is its 
payoff function. Suppose that for each i E N and for each j = 1,2,. . . , ki, the following conditions 
axe satisfied. 
(i) Ai has nonempty convex values and for each yi E Xi, (Ai)-’ is compactly open in X’ 
and the set niEN{x E X : xi E Ai( is compactly closed in X where X = niEN Xi. 
(ii) fj is jointly lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for each yi E Xi, the 
function x; H fj(yi, z”) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X’. 
(iii) For each fixed 3:; E X’, the function yi ++ fj (yi, 2”) is convex. 
(iv) There exists a nonempty compact convex subset Xi of Xi and a nonempty compact (not 
necessarily convex) subset Ki ofXi such that for each x E X\K, there is a y E co(Xt$J{x}) 
such that fji(z?, x”) > fj(y”, x:“) for all i E N and j = 1,. . . , Ici where X0 = niEN Xi and 
K = &EN Ki. 
Then the constrained ,multiobjective game r has at least a Pareto equilibrium point ? E X. 
PROOF. Take any fixed weighted vector W = (W’, W2,. . . , Wn) E niEn int Tf‘. From Condi- 
tions (i)-(iv) and Remark 4.2, it is easy to check that all conditions of Corollary 4.1 are satisfied. 
Thus, r has at least ;a weighted Nash-equilibrium point P E X with respect to the weighted 
vector W. As W E J-J& int TF , by Lemma 5.1, f must be a Pareto equilibrium point of the 
constrained multiobjective game r. This completes the proof. 
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REMARK 5.3. Corollary 5.2 generalizes Theorem 3 of [12], Theorem 6 of [13], and Theorem 3.2 
of [lo] to constrained multiobjective games, and hence, Theorem 5.1 further unifies and generalizes 
the above results to noncompact constrained multiobjective games and to H-space without linear 
structure. 
REFERENCES 
1. J.F. Nash, Equilibrium point in n-person games, hoc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 36, 48-49, (1950). 
2. J.F. Nash, Noncooperative games, Ann. Math. 54, 286-295, (1951). 
3. F. Szidarovszky, M.E. Gershon and L. Duckstein, Techniques for Multiobjective Decision Making in System 
Management, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Holland, (1986). 
4. M. Zeleny, Game with multiple payoffs, International J. Game Theory 4, 179-191, (1976). 
5. K. Bergstresser and P.L. Yu, Domination structures and multicriteria problem in N-person games, Theory 
and Decision 8, 5-47, (1977). 
6. P.E.M. Borm, S.H. Tijs and J.C.M. Van Den Aarssen, Pareto equilibrium in multiobjective games, Methods 
of Operations Research 60, 303-312, (1990). 
7. P.L. Yu, Second-order game problems: Decision dynamics in gaming phenomena, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 
27, 147-166, (1979). 
8. D. Chose and U.R. Prssad, Solution concepts in two-person multicriteria games, J. Optim. Theo? Appl. 63, 
167-189, (1989). 
9. S.Y. Wang, An existence theorem of a Pareto equilibrium, Appl. Math. Lett. 4 (3), 61-63, (1991). 
10. S.Y. Wang, Existence of a Pareto equilibrium, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 79, 373-384, (1993). 
11. X.P. Ding, Pareto equilibria of multicriteria games without compactness, continuity and concavity, Appl. 
Math. Mech. 1’7 (9), 847-854, (1996). 
12. X.Z. Yuan and E. Tarafdar, Non-compact Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 
204, 156-163, (1996). 
13. J. Yu and X.Z. Yuan, The study of Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games by fixed point and Ky Fan 
minimax inequality methods, Computers Math. Applic. 35 (9), 17-24, (1998). 
14. C. Bardaro and L. Ceppitelli, Some further generalizations of Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz theorem 
and minimax inequalities, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 132, 484-490, (1988). 
15. C. Bardaro and L. Ceppitelli, Applications of generalized Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz theorem to vari- 
ational inequalities, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 137, 46-58, (1989). 
16. C. Horvath, Points fixes et coincidences dans les espaces topologiques compacts contractiles, C. R. Acad. Sci. 
Paris 299, 519-521, (1984). 
17. C. Horvath, Some results on multivalued mappings and inequalities without convexity, In Nonlinear and 
Convex Analysis: Lecture Notes in Pure and Applied Mathematics, Vol. 107, (Edited by B.L. Lin and 
S. Simons), pp. 99-106, Dekker, New York, (1987). 
18. E. Tarafdar, A fixed point theorem in H-space a.nd related results, Bull. Austral. Math. Sot. 42, 133-140, 
(1990). 
19. J.X. Zhou and G. Chen, Diagonally convexity conditions for problems in convex analysis and quasi-variational 
inequalities, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 132, 213-225, (1988). 
20. J.P. Aubin, Mathematical Methods of Game and Economic Theory, North-Holland, Amsterdam, (1982). 
21. J.P. Aubin and I. Ekeland, Applied Nonlinear Analysis, Wiley, New York, (1984). 
22. X.P. Ding, Quasi-variational inequalities and social equilibrium, Appl. Math. Mech. 12 (7), 639-646, (1991). 
23. X.P. Ding, Generalized quasi-variational inequalities, optimization and equilibrium problems, J. Sichuan 
Normal Univ. 21 (l), 22-27, (1998). 
24. G. Tian, Generalizations of the FKKM theorem and the Fan minimax inequality with applications to maximal 
elements, price equilibrium and complementarity, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 170, 457-471, (1992). 
25. X.Z. Yuan, G. Isac, K.K. Tan and J. Yu, The study of minimax inequalities, abstract economics and appli- 
cations to variational inequalities and Nash equilibria, Acta Appt. Math. 54, 135-166, (1998). 
26. X.P. Ding, Fixed points, minimax inequalities and equilibria of noncompact abstract economies, Taiwanese 
J. Math. 2 (l), 25-55, (1998). 
27. X.P. Ding, Existence of solutions for quasi-equilibrium problems, J. Sichuan Normal Univ. 21 (6), 603-608, 
(1998). 
28. P. Cubiotti, Existence of solutions for lower semicontinuous quasi-equilibrium problems, Computers Math. 
Applic. 30 (12), 11-22, (1995). 
